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The uncanny valley (UCV) hypothesis describes a non-linear relationship between
perceived human-likeness and affective response. The “uncanny valley” refers to an
intermediate level of human-likeness that is associated with strong negative affect.
Recent studies have suggested that the uncanny valley might result from the categorical
perception of human-like stimuli during identification. When presented with stimuli
sharing human-like traits, participants attempt to segment the continuum in “human” and
“non-human” categories. Due to the ambiguity of stimuli located at a category boundary,
categorization difficulty gives rise to a strong, negative affective response. Importantly,
researchers who have studied the UCV in terms of categorical perception have focused
on categorization responses rather than affective ratings. In the present study, we
examined whether the negative affect associated with the UCV might be explained in
terms of an individual’s degree of exposure to stimuli. In two experiments, we tested a
frequency-based model against a categorical perception model using a category-learning
paradigm.Wemanipulated the frequency of exemplars that were presented to participants
from two categories during a training phase. We then examined categorization and
affective responses functions, as well as the relationship between categorization and
affective responses. Supporting previous findings, categorization responses suggested
that participants acquired novel category structures that reflected a category boundary.
These category structures appeared to influence affective ratings of eeriness. Crucially,
participants’ ratings of eeriness were additionally affected by exemplar frequency. Taken
together, these findings suggest that the UCV is determined by both categorical properties
as well as the frequency of individual exemplars retained in memory.
Keywords: uncanny valley, categorical perception, category learning, categorization, exemplar theory, exemplar-
based, frequency-based, affect
INTRODUCTION
Categorization is a critical determinant of human survival. In the
absence of categories, humans would be required to learn whether
each stimulus that we encountered was desirable or noxious as
well as whether the conspecifics that we encountered were kin
or competitors. The variability in cross-cultural folktaxonomies
(Medin and Atran, 1999), color classification (Regier and Kay,
2009), and speech perception (Pisoni et al., 1982) demonstrates
that while humans might have prepotent responses to ranges of
stimuli, many of these distinctions can be modified or must be
learned. When available within the classification system of soci-
ety, these categories can be associated with strong, negative affect
responses (Schoenherr and Burleigh, 2014). Thus, categories both
reflect and determine one’s experience of the world.
Group membership and identity form an especially relevant
class of categories for humans (for a review, see Fiske and Taylor,
2013). In the social context, repeated exposure to individu-
als within a group can increase affiliation and conformity (for
review, see Bond and Smith, 1996) among group members while
also leading to negative affective responses toward out-group
members (for review, see Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). This
suggests the possibility that mixing features that have strong asso-
ciations with members of contrasting categories will either lead
to a reduction in positive affect or an increase in negative affect
(Burleigh et al., 2013). In contrast to categorical perception, sub-
categorical properties such as exposure to individual exemplars
has long been considered an important determinant of affective
responses (e.g., Fechner, 1876; Maslow, 1937; Zajonc, 1968). The
present study considers how the comparatively low frequency of
exposure to stimuli selected from a region of a continuum can
lead to negative affective responses. We examine this in the con-
text of negative affective responses to stimuli containing features
from contrasting categories.
In the context of human factors, Mori’s (1970) Uncanny Valley
Hypothesis (UVH) suggests that human-like objects in our envi-
ronment might come to be associated with negative affect if they
possess a certain degree of human-likeness. Recently, a number
of authors have suggested potential explanations of the UVH that
are either explicitly or implicitly based on categorical perception
(Cheetham et al., 2011, 2013; Moore, 2012; Burleigh et al., 2013;
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Yamada et al., 2013; Ferrey et al., submitted). While these studies
have made important theoretical contributions, the implications
of different learned category representations on the UCV phe-
nomenon have not been directly tested. In the present study, we
sought to address this gap by using a category-learning paradigm
in which groups of participants received different sets of training
stimuli consisting of computer-generated creatures. We examine
participants responses to creatures following training, specify the
conditions in which affective minima associated with the UCV
would be observed, the properties of category learning that would
determine the location of affective minima, and what underlying
representation of category structures would best fit the response
patterns that we observed.
THE UNCANNY VALLEY
While the essential phenomenon of the uncanny valley has a
number of cultural antecedents (Schoenherr and Burleigh, 2014),
the Uncanny Valley Hypothesis (UVH) remains underspecified.
Mori (1970) initially proposed that human-like stimuli can elicit
positive or negative feelings depending on their degree of simi-
larity to humans. In contrast to the linear relationship between
familiarity and positive affect for human and human-like faces
(see Experiment 1, Burleigh et al., 2013), the UVH predicts a
non-linear relationship. Mori’s account assumes that as stim-
uli become defined by more human-like features, they will elicit
greater positive affect. But importantly, his account also assumes
that there is a critical region of intermediate human-likeness
where a sharp decrease in positive feelings are observed. As illus-
trated in Figure 1, the proposed relationship resembles a cubic
function, and the global minimum is referred to as the “valley.”
It is important to distinguish between the classic and general-
ized forms of the UVH. The classic account of the UVH provided
byMori (1970) is defined as a non-linear function. In his account,
the x-axis of this function is defined as human-likeness, and it
is anchored by a non-human or minimally human-like entity at
one end (e.g., a robot) and a real human at the other end. One
reason to question this account is that it was informed by anecdo-
tal evidence in the context of the human-like design of machines
FIGURE 1 | The N-Shaped Uncanny Valley function, as proposed by
Mori (1970) (illustration adapted from MacDorman, 2005).
and other artifacts. The basic premise that negative affect could
be a consequence of mismatch between features associated with
contrasting classes would explain many cross-cultural phenom-
ena (Schoenherr and Burleigh, 2014). In contrast to this, the
UVH could be taken as assuming that the non-linear response
function observed with human-likeness is a special case of more
general cognitive and affective processes associated with stimulus
frequency and categorical perception. Thus, it follows that similar
non-linear phenomena should be observed in response to per-
ceptual continua that represent non-human anchors with similar
properties.
Evidence that has been interpreted as supporting the classic
UVH has been obtained from studies using a variety of stimuli
selected from a number of ontological categories. A majority of
these studies have observed affective functions that are consis-
tent with the UVH when using stimuli representing computer-
generated morph sequences of human and non-human entities,
including non-human animals, robots, and anthropomorphic
dolls (MacDorman and Ishiguro, 2006; Seyama and Nagayama,
2007; Burleigh et al., 2013; Ferrey et al., submitted). Many studies
have also observed the affective function in response to images of
existing artifacts that vary in human-likeness, such as androids,
videogame characters, and prosthetic hands (Bartneck et al.,
2007; Schneider et al., 2007; Poliakoff et al., 2013); however,
it is worth noting that several studies have not found support
for the classic account of the UVH (MacDorman et al., 2009;
Cheetham et al., 2014). Across those studies which have found
support, a general observation is that affective response is posi-
tively correlated with human-likeness, except at an intermediate
level of human-likeness where there is a maximum of negative
affect.
Few studies have examined the possibility that perceptual
continua representing non-human entities could produce UCV
phenomena. To the best of our knowledge, only two studies have
examined this possibility. In Yamada et al. (2013, Experiment
2) morph sequences were generated that represented transitions
between cartoon, stuffed, and real dogs. In Ferrey et al. (submit-
ted, Experiment 1), bistable morph sequences were used that rep-
resented transitions between various non-human animals (e.g.,
between a duck and an elephant). In each of these studies, regions
of maximal negative affect were found at intermediate levels of
the perceptual continua, which is consistent with the generalized
account of the UVH (see, Burleigh et al., 2013, Experiment 2).
Between general formulations of the UVH and empirical sup-
port for UCV-like phenomena, greater theoretical consideration
of the affective and cognitive processes is required to define the
conditions under which the UCV will be observed as well as to
differentiate it from related phenomena.
EXPLANATIONS FOR THE UNCANNY VALLEY PHENOMENON
Although the UVH provides a description of the non-linear
response function, it does not explain why this function occurs,
nor does it specify the mechanisms that are responsible. A
common explanation is that the negative affect associated with
uncanny stimuli might be a consequence of biological adapta-
tions for threat avoidance behaviors (e.g., MacDorman et al.,
2009). Stimuli within the valley might be convincing depictions
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of humans while falling short of a satisfactory level of human-
likeness due to imperfections. These imperfections might cause
them to be seen as “humans with disease” which triggers an
aversive response (MacDorman and Ishiguro, 2006; MacDorman
et al., 2009; Burleigh et al., 2013, Experiment 2). There is some
evidence supporting this account. For example, Ho et al. (2008)
observed that disgust could explain a significant portion of
the variance in eeriness ratings. Furthermore, Steckenfinger and
Ghazanfar (2009) observed that macaque monkeys displayed an
aversion (as measured with looking times) to images of con-
specifics that were of intermediate realism, which suggests that
there might be an evolutionary basis to the phenomenon.
From this account, it might be reasonable to assume that
the UCV phenomenon is specific to observers viewing images
of conspecifics—an assumption that would be consistent with
the classic UVH. Given that the spread of communicable dis-
eases depends on the genetic similarity between the observer
and the stimulus entity, it is possible that a species could have
evolved mechanisms that allow them to respond to pathogen
cues in conspecifics, but not heterospecifics. Communicable dis-
eases, however, are not the only source of contamination that
members of a species have had to contend with in their envi-
ronments. As Rozin and Fallon (1987) point out, disgust is also
a food-related emotion, which serves to prevent the oral incorpo-
ration of contaminated substances. As Schoenherr and Burleigh
(2014) discuss, food substances that share features from two cat-
egories have been associated with aversive responses, such as
food taboos (e.g., some refer to a certain transgenic tomato as
a “Frankenfood” because it incorporates genes from a winter
flounder). This suggests that the UCV phenomenon might not
be specific to observers viewing images of conspecifics, but that
it might also occur more generally in response to the categori-
cal ambiguity of certain types of stimuli. Even if these accounts
are correct, general learning mechanisms would also allow for the
adjustment of diagnostic features of disease as well as inclusion
and exclusion of categories associated with disease as a result of
an individual’s experiences with their environment.
Another theory that accounts for threat avoidance behavior
is based on the premise that appearances provide information
that allows individuals to predict behavior, and thus to antici-
pate potential threats in their environment. Some uncanny valley
stimuli can be seen to present mismatched features (Seyama and
Nagayama, 2007; MacDorman et al., 2009; Mitchell et al., 2011;
Saygin et al., 2012), such as a machine with a convincingly human
voice, or an android with a physical appearance that is highly
realistic but movements that are robotic. In this account, stim-
ulus features, such as physical appearances, drive the automatic
selection of a neural model for the purpose of predicting behav-
ior. Stimulus mismatches can therefore lead to the selection of an
inaccurate neural model, which is associated with error-related
brain activity (Saygin et al., 2012), and error-related process-
ing might result in negative affect. These neural models thus
require learning in order to acquire ontological categories that
subsequently produce contrasts due to feature mismatch.
THE UNCANNY VALLEY AS CATEGORICAL PERCEPTION
If feature mismatch is the result of the inclusion of features
from neighboring categories, then a crucial feature of any general
account of the UVH is the specification of category learning
systems that acquire the category structure, as well as the rep-
resentations that are retained within them (for a recent review,
see Goldstone et al., 2012). A number of studies have attempted
to qualify the UVH by making reference to principles and pro-
cesses associated with categorization generally, and categorical
perception more specifically (Cheetham et al., 2011, 2013; Moore,
2012; Burleigh et al., 2013; Yamada et al., 2013; Ferrey et al.
submitted). Categorical perception (CP) accounts of the UVH
suggest that this phenomenon is a consequence of categorical pro-
cesses associated with stimulus identification. Specifically, stimuli
along a human-likeness continuum are perceived as members
of either a “human” or “non-human” category, except at the
category boundary where their membership is ambiguous. This
follows from the position that stimuli at the category bound-
ary should not provide the observer with sufficient perceptual
evidence to allow easy or accurate identification on the basis
of their representation of the category structure. As a conse-
quence, uncertainty and negative affect are produced due to
competition during categorization response selection (Cheetham
et al., 2011; Burleigh et al., 2013), which might in turn acti-
vate conflict resolution processes like inhibitory devaluation
(Ferrey et al., submitted).
Empirical evidence is consistent with accounts of the uncanny
valley based on categorical perception. For instance, Cheetham
et al. (2011, 2013) demonstrated that participants’ response laten-
cies were longest when categorizing stimuli that were located
at, or adjacent to, the category boundary on a human-avatar
morph continuum. In addition to this, Burleigh et al. (2013,
Experiment 2), Ferrey et al. (submitted), and Yamada et al.
(2013), have each observed non-linear affective response func-
tions across between-category (including human-animal and
animal-animal) morph sequences that peaked at the midpoint
between categories where stimuli were most ambiguous. Relative
to the categorization literature, these accounts are underspec-
ified, and therefore do not provide a complete account of
the UCV phenomenon. Moreover, whereas Cheetham et al.
(2011, 2013) and Yamada et al. (2013) have made a crucial
connection between categorization and the response patterns
associated with the uncanny valley, we cannot assume that
categorization performance will be the only, or even the pri-
mary, determinant of affect. As we discuss, the uncanny valley
might also be attributed to sub-categorical processes, such as
those involved in assessing stimulus frequencies (Zajonc, 1968;
Bornstein, 1989).
CATEGORY BOUNDARY AND EXEMPLAR REPRESENTATIONS
Any explanation of the UCV phenomenon based on categori-
cal perception must consider categorization processes and rep-
resentational assumptions (e.g., prototype-related models were
recently considered by Moore, 2012). Most CP accounts of the
UVH appear to have assumed that categorization is governed by a
“category boundary” representation (Cheetham et al., 2011, 2013;
Burleigh et al., 2013). Category boundary models suggest that
when a stimulus is encountered, it is used to locate and modify
the location of a decision boundary in perceptual space (Ashby
and Gott, 1988). When individuals are presented with a novel
stimulus, they will compare its location in perceptual space to
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that of the category boundary. Proximity to the category bound-
ary thereby increases categorization uncertainty (Paul et al., 2011;
Schoenherr and Lacroix, 2014), and according to CP accounts
of the UVH, proximity is also assumed to be inversely related to
affect.
However, while a category boundary model might provide an
adequate explanation of the uncanny “valley,” which is a sim-
ple U-shaped quadratic function, it cannot account for the entire
UCV response function, which is a more complex N-shaped cubic
function (e.g., Mori, 1970). We suggest that models that take
into consideration exemplar-based information might account
for the additional features of a more complex function. Exemplar-
based models assume that a memory trace is encoded each time
a stimulus is encountered (Medin and Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky,
1984). During the course of learning, each instance becomes asso-
ciated with a category label, and at the end of learning each
exemplar is represented by a probability distribution of features.
Over the course of learning, an individual’s attentional focus
becomes reweighted to different regions of the stimulus contin-
uum (Nosofsky, 1984, 1986), such that attention is sensitized to
between-category differences and desensitized to within-category
differences. When presented with a novel exemplar, individuals
will compare it to all exemplars available in memory, and the
similarity between the new item and old items in memory will
determine the new item’s category membership.
Thus, a key difference between category boundary and
exemplar-based models is how individuals become sensitized to
perceptual space. Category boundary models suggest that indi-
viduals can only typically become sensitized to a single region
of perceptual space, namely where the category boundary is
located; whereas exemplar-based models suggest that individu-
als can become sensitized to multiple regions of perceptual space,
due to the distributions of individual members (Nosofsky, 1984,
1986).
THE UCV AS CATEGORICAL PERCEPTION OR FREQUENCY-BASED
EXPOSURE
Crucially, affective processing of stimuli might not require the
instantiation of categorical processes. The mere-exposure effect
(Zajonc, 1968) suggests that repeated exposure to stimuli can lead
to the formation of preferences, and negative affect might there-
fore be accounted for on the basis of familiarity or perceptual
fluency alone (for a review, see Bornstein, 1989). In support of
this, Harmon-Jones and Allen (2001) reported physiological evi-
dence (via EMG and EEG) of affective responses that resulted
from mere-exposure to stimuli, which corresponded with self-
reported evaluations. If the mere-exposure effect can be extended
to all members of a perceptual continuum, then an observer’s
familiarity with individual members of the continuum might
be able to explain non-linear affective response functions. For
example, along a human-likeness continuum that is anchored by
“human” and “robot,” individuals will have encountered a com-
paratively larger number of human instances relative to robots.
Instances within these two categories should bemuchmore famil-
iar than instances that combine their features (e.g., androids).
Thus, in contrast to the categorical perception account, a nega-
tive affective peak at an intermediate region in perceptual space
might be explained by the fewer number of instances with the
conjunction of features represented by stimuli in that region. On
this basis, we suggest two distinct accounts of the UCV.
We suggest that at least two broad relationships are pos-
sible between cognitive and affective processing of stimuli,
which we conceptualize as categorical perception (Figure 2A) and
frequency-based exposure (Figure 2B) stage models. In concep-
tualizing these models, we limit ourselves to unidirectional pro-
cessing. We assume that stimulus processing is mediated by the
information that is stored in long-term memory, which includes
memory traces of past episodes.
The categorical perception model (Figure 2A) reflects our
understanding of extant categorical perception accounts of the
UCV, in that it assumes categorical and affective responses derive
from a common processing stage. In this model, individuals
process sub-categorical information such as basic perceptual
properties (e.g., stimulus magnitude, orientation) and frequency,
but this information does not directly influence responding.
Subsequent to this stage, category structures stored in long-term
memory are activated, and these structures are used to determine
both affective and categorical responses.
Alternatively, the frequency-based exposure model
(Figure 2B) assumes that categorical and affective responses
derive from separable processing stages. Specifically, affective
responses are also driven by sub-categorical processing, which
relies on frequency-based memory representations to provide
more basic information such as frequency. The models defined
in Figures 2A,B are sufficiently distinct that their predictions can
be tested in a category-learning paradigm.
PRESENT STUDY
The present study was designed to test the predictions of the mul-
tistage models of the uncanny valley presented in Figures 2A,B,
and a nested prediction concerning category structures. In
the categorical perception model, the affective and categorical
responses are derived from the same processing stage. Such a
model therefore leads to a prediction of similar patterns of affec-
tive and categorical responses, as well as a strong and positive
correlation between them. In contrast to this, the frequency-based
exposure model implies that categorical and affective responses
each account for unique sources of variance. Such a model there-
fore suggests that under some conditions patterns of responses
might be similar, but they need not show a significant correlation.
Importantly, the stage models do not make predictions con-
cerning the specific nature of categorical processing, only the rela-
tionship between categorical and affective responses. Therefore,
a nested prediction concerns whether categorization will reflect
category boundary or exemplar-based representations. The first
possibility is that individuals will only have access to a category
boundary representation that partitions the response continuum.
Therefore, categorization accuracy and affective responses should
increase, and response times should decrease, as a function of a
stimulus’ distance away from the category boundary. If partic-
ipants are insensitive to individual characteristics, then catego-
rization uncertainty should also be evidenced by a linear increase
in response latencies as a function of proximity to the category
boundary. Alternatively, if exemplar-based representations are
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FIGURE 2 | Multistage UCV processing models derived from categorical
perception (A) and frequency-based exposure accounts (B). Stage 1
(Encoding) relies on immediate memory whereas Stage 3 (Categorical)
requires long-term memory (LTM) activation. Stage 2 (Sub-Categorical)
requires activation of frequency-based properties retained in long-term
memory.
Table 1 | Stimulus Frequencies for Training Session in Experimental Conditions for equal frequency, even distributions (EFED), unequal
frequency, even distributions (UFED), and unequal frequency, uneven distributions (UFUD).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Tot.
EFED – – 4 4 4 4 4 – 4 4 4 4 4 – – 40
UFED – – 8 6 4 2 – – – 2 4 6 8 – – 40
UFUD – – 8 6 4 2 – – 4 4 4 4 4 – – 40
acquired for two contrasting categories and used for categorical
processing, then the location of the central tendencies for each
category should determine the location of the maxima and min-
ima of the response functions for affective and categorization
responses. Response latencies should evidence a similar trend.
Specifically, if uncertainty in category membership is a function
of exemplar frequency, then we would expect exemplars pre-
sented with comparatively high frequency during training to be
associated with fast responses whereas exemplars presented with
comparatively low frequency to be associated with slow responses.
In order to test the predictions of these models, our exper-
imental design uses a category-learning paradigm in which we
manipulate exemplar frequency along the perceptual contin-
uum. Experiment 1 consists of two training conditions. In the
first condition, stimuli within response categories are presented
with equal frequency, with each category having an equivalent
distribution (EFED). In the second condition, both category dis-
tributions are equivalent, but the exemplars were presented with
unequal frequency (UFED) such that stimuli near the extrema of
Categories A and B training sets are presented with the great-
est frequency, and stimuli adjacent to the category boundary
were presented with the lowest frequency. An important aspect
of our design is that individuals are not exposed to the contin-
uum extrema during the training phase. Thus, while the category
boundary of the EFED and the UFED conditions should be iden-
tical, differences in exemplar frequency should decrease affective
responses outside the training range if frequency-based informa-
tion is a determinant of categorical and/or affective responses.
The results of Experiment 1 should provide a straightforward
tests of our predictions. Left unaddressed, however, is what we
consider to be a tacit property of UCV as discussed by Mori
(1970): we are presented with less exemplar variability within
one category (e.g., human) and greater exemplar variability in
the contrasting category (e.g., non-human). In Experiment 2, we
used one category defined by exemplars with equal frequencies
selected from the EFED condition and another category defined
by exemplars with unequal frequencies selected from the UFED
condition. This procedure resulted in an unequal frequency,
unequal distribution condition (UFUD) which we take as a closer
approximation to the properties of the UCV first proposed by
Mori (1970). Table 1 provides training set frequencies.
Crucially, we were also interested in determining whether the
affective response patterns could reasonably support a UCV inter-
pretation. We distinguish between “strong” and “weak” interpre-
tation as follows. The UCV function is a non-linear response
function that is defined by a slope, indicating a category pref-
erence attributable to familiarity (e.g., for humans over robots),
and a valley region that is located near the category boundary
but skewed toward the preferred category. Thus, support for a
strong interpretation of the UCV would be obtained if a response
function possessed all of these features; support for a weak inter-
pretation of the UCV would be obtained if a response function
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possessed some of these features, such as a valley region without
a slope. We anticipate the possibility that the EFED and UFED
conditions might provide support for a weak interpretation, but
not for the strong interpretation, due to their symmetry. In con-
trast, the UFUD condition might provide support for a strong
interpretation of the UCV due to the asymmetry of the response
function.
Although the stimuli that we use all represent non-human
entities, we believe the findings of these studies are pertinent
to human-like stimuli. By using non-human stimuli we hope to
minimize the influence of stimulus familiarity or preference for
human stimuli. This novelty facilitates the task of training par-
ticipants to learn different category structures in an experimental
setting with practical limitations (e.g., time). This manipulation
also allows us to illustrate that response patterns associated with
the UCV are generally patterns that can be attributed to stimulus
familiarity rather than human-likeness, per se.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 was designed as an initial test of our predic-
tions derived from the hypothesized multistage models, and
to provide evidence in support of the UCV phenomenon. We
manipulated the frequency of stimulus presentation to differen-
tially sensitize participants to regions of the stimulus response
continuum. An equal frequency condition (EFED) was pro-
vided to half of the participants, wherein all stimuli within
a category were presented with equal frequency, thereby cre-
ating a uniform distribution. An unequal frequency condition
(UFED) was provided to the remaining half of the partici-
pants, wherein stimuli located within the middle of each cate-
gory distribution were presented with higher frequency, thereby
approximating a normal distribution. In each case, distributions
of stimuli from Category A and Category B were symmetri-
cal. Thus, by the end of training we hypothesized that par-
ticipants should learn the distribution of the training stimuli
equally well. Following training, participants responded to stim-
uli selected from the entire continuum. In the UFED condition,
we additionally predicted that participants should show changes
in affective responses due to less familiarity with the extreme




A total of 60 participants were recruited online for this study (31
female,Mage = 37.2). Participants were recruited from Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk platform and paid a total of $5 if they completed
all 4 sessions of the study ($1 for session 1, $1.25 for sessions
2 and 3, and $1.5 for session 4). All participants were registered
with Mechanical Turk as United States residents. No participants
reported having a visual impairment, and therefore no partici-
pants were excluded from our analyses. All participants consented
to participate in the study.
Stimuli
Three morph sequences were generated, comprising the permu-
tations of three distinct non-human creatures: a beast, a reptile,
and an alien. These creatures were selected given our assumption
that participants would have less familiarity with these categories
thereby allowing us to more readily manipulate their frequency
of exposure in the experimental context. Creatures were created
using Daz Studio 4.6 Pro (daz3d.com) by modifying the mor-
phology and texture of the Genesis base figure. Morph sequences
were then created by stepwise adjustment of morphology and tex-
ture parameters corresponding to each creature. For example, the
reptile creature had a “head scale” parameter which determined
the size of its head, with a value of 32, whereas the alien crea-
ture had a value of 40. Therefore, the stimulus at the midpoint
on the alien-reptile morph continuum assumed a value for this
parameter that was half-way between the alien and reptile val-
ues (i.e., 36). Stimuli were then cropped in photo-editing software
using an elliptical mask, and saved as images with a vertical res-
olution of 548 pixels. Stimuli were divided into training and test
sets. The following stimuli were excluded from all training sets:
stimulus 6 (the category boundary), and stimuli 1, 2, 14, and 15
(the extrema). Other stimuli were excluded depending on the fre-
quency condition. For instance, stimuli 7 and 9 were not included
in the training set for the UFED condition due to the frequency
manipulation.
Procedure
Training. At the start of the experiment, participants were pre-
sented with stimuli during the training and test phases of the
experiment by randomly assigning them to a creature continuum
(for an example, see Figure 3) and a frequency condition (see
Table 1). In order to control for the effect of creature continua,
we used a counter-balanced design such that an equal number of
participants were assigned to each of the (creature x frequency)
conditions. This resulted in a total of 5 participants for each cell
of the design, or 30 participants in each of the experimental con-
ditions that were of interest. In the EFED condition, participants
received an equal presentation of stimuli selected from the train-
ing range, whereas in the UFED condition participants received
an unequal presentation of stimuli selected from the training
range; in each case the frequency distributions were symmetrical.
At the beginning of training, participants were instructed that
they would be presented with “models of unfamiliar living crea-
tures” and that their task was to “learn what categories they
belonged to.” They were told that each creature was either a “Cax”
or a “Miv” and that they were to press the “C” or “M” key depend-
ing on which type of creature they thought they saw. Participants
were instructed to balance the demands of speed and accuracy.
Key assignment was counter-balanced across participants.
Participants completed 1 training session per day over the
course of 3 days. Each training session was composed of 10 blocks
of 40 trials each, for a total of 400 trials per training session, and
each session required approximately 20min to complete. For each
trial, a fixation point was presented for 500ms, followed by a ran-
domly selected stimulus from the training distribution for 750ms
(these timings were selected to be consistent with Cheetham et al.,
2011). At the end of this sequence the response alternatives were
presented until a response was registered. After a response was
registered, feedback in the form of a “correct” or “incorrect”
message was presented for 500ms.
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FIGURE 3 | Reptile-beast, beast-alien, and alien-reptile morph continua; stimuli shown here: 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, and 15.
Test. In the test session, all 15 stimuli were presented. Unlike
the previous blocks, we sought to limit the amount of expo-
sure to previously unseen stimuli. Therefore, the test session
consisted of 4 blocks, in which each stimulus was presented 2
times each, for a total of 120 trials. The training session required
approximately 12min to complete. Stimulus presentation pre-
ceded in the same manner as in the training phase with two
notable exceptions. Following presentation of a stimulus, partic-
ipants were asked to rate its eeriness on a scale ranging from 1
(not at all eerie) to 7 (extremely eerie) using the “1” through
“7” keys, respectively. After registering their response, partici-
pants were then asked to indicate whether it was a “Cax” or
“Miv,” as in previous sessions. The ordering of affective and cat-
egorization responses was deliberate in order to ensure that the
effect of categorical information on ratings of eeriness would
be limited.
Implementation. The study was developed for the web using
HTML and JavaScript programming languages for the frontend,
and PHP/MySQL for the backend. Preliminary tests using an
automated responder on a test machine revealed that response
time noise was within acceptable limits (i.e., less than 35ms). Our
online research environment is comparable to the one used by
Crump et al. (2013). Crump et al., used JavaScript and recruited
Mechanical Turk participants to successfully replicate numerous
reaction time tasks like the Stroop (1935).
RESULTS
In order to test our predictions, we analyzed training and test
responses separately in terms of categorization accuracy, response
time, eeriness ratings, and the shape of categorization and affec-
tive response functions. A series of repeated-measures analy-
ses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted. Greenhouse-Geisser
adjusted values are reported with unadjusted degrees of free-
dom. All reported pairwise comparisons were conducted using
a Bonferroni adjustment. We also report partial-eta squared as a
measure of effect size. Following this, we use curve fitting analyses




A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on categorization
accuracy, using stimulus location relative to the category bound-
ary (4) and response category (2) as within-subjects variables, and
stimulus training distribution (2) as a between-subjects variable.
Here, response categories (i.e., “Cax” and “Miv”) were randomly
assigned to stimuli located on the left- and right-halves of the
stimulus continuum. Given the counterbalancing of stimulus
sets, we collapsed across morph models prior to analysis. Stimuli
directly adjacent to the category boundary in the UFED training
condition were also removed prior to analysis. This adjustment
was made due to the fact that these stimuli were not present in the
EFED training condition and might introduce bias in the analy-
sis. Similarly, the stimulus located at the category boundary was
not presented during training and was therefore absent from the
analysis of test responses.
Our analysis of training response accuracy revealed a signifi-
cant main effect for stimulus distance from the category bound-
ary, F(3, 174) = 11.921, MSE < 0.001, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.17. As
Figure 4 suggests, categorization accuracy increased as a function
of distance from the category boundary with the lowest accuracy
observed for stimuli nearest the category boundary (Stimuli 6 and
10) and the greatest accuracy observed for the most extreme stim-
uli (Stimuli 3 and 13). Supporting our interpretation of the data,
pairwise comparisons revealed significant differences between
stimuli nearest the category boundary (i.e., stimuli 6 and 10) and
stimuli at all other distances (ps < 0.012). No other main effects
or interactions reached significance, ps > 0.11. Thus, the primary
determinant of categorization accuracy during training was the
location of a stimulus along the morphed continuum.
1A secondary analysis of arcsine transformed data revealed the same pattern
as the analysis of untransformed data.
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FIGURE 4 | Training categorization response accuracy in equal
frequency (EFED) and unequal frequency conditions (UFED). Stimulus
values correspond to stimuli selected from the training range (i.e., stimuli
3–13). Error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean (N = 60).
Categorization response times
Using the same design as the analysis of accuracy, a repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted on categorization response
time. To eliminate outlying observations, we first computed
an unadjusted mean response time for each participant and
identified trials wherein their responses were 3 standard devi-
ations above the mean. This accounted for 2.1% of trials.
Consistent with our analysis of categorization accuracy, cate-
gorization response time decreased as a function of distance
from the category boundary, F(3, 174) = 5.061, MSE = 1380.276,
p = 0.005, η2p = 0.08.
As Figure 5 demonstrates, stimuli near the category boundary
were associated with longer response times than stimuli at more
distal locations. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the response
latency for stimuli close to the category boundary significantly
differed for adjacent stimuli and those located at extreme dis-
tances (ps< 0.044). No other main effects or interactions reached
significance, ps > 0.1. Again, these results provide additional evi-
dence that the primary determinant of categorization response




A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on accuracy of
responses obtained during the test phase. This analysis was com-
parable to that of the training phase with the exception that due
to the uniform distribution used during the test phase for both
training groups, stimuli adjacent to the category boundary as
well as novel extrapolation items outside the range of the train-
ing items were also included in the analysis. Again, the stimulus
located at the category boundary was eliminated from the anal-
ysis due to its ambiguity (it was entered into another analysis,
see the Categorization response times and Affective ratings of
eeriness sections below). Thus, stimulus location relative to the
category boundary (7) and response category (2) were entered as
FIGURE 5 | Training categorization response time in equal frequency
(EFED) and unequal frequency conditions (UFED). Stimulus values
correspond to stimuli selected from the training range (i.e., stimuli 3–13).
Error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean (N = 60).
within-subjects variables, and stimulus training distribution (2)
was entered as a between-subjects variable.
Replicating the findings of categorization accuracy obtained
in the training phase, we observed a significant main effect of
stimulus distance from the category boundary, F(6, 348) = 54.516,
MSE = 0.021, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.485. An interaction was also
observed between stimulus distance and frequency distribution,
F(6, 348) = 5.292,MSE = 0.021, p = 0.007, η2p = 0.082. An exam-
ination of Figure 6 reveals a more pronounced decrement in
categorization accuracy around the category boundary in the test
phase relative to the training phase. This trend was especially
pronounced for participants in the unequal frequency (UFED)
training condition, and suggests that participants were affected
by the distributional properties in the test phase.
Categorization response times
A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on categorization
response time in the test phase. In order to compare to affec-
tive response functions (see below), the stimulus at the category
boundary was also included. Therefore, unlike previous analyses,
the entire stimulus continuum was tested. Thus, stimulus loca-
tion (15) was entered as a within-subjects variable and stimulus
training distribution (2) as a between-subjects variable. An anal-
ysis of response time outliers was again conducted on individual
participants’ responses. After obtaining an unadjusted mean, no
responses were observed to be larger than 3 standard deviations
above the mean. This result is not surprising given the reduced
number of replications in the test phase.
As with the response time analysis in the training phase, a
main effect was observed for stimulus location, F(14, 812) = 4.631,
MSE = 188391.325, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.053. Figure 7 indicates
that this effect can be accounted for by the slower response times
for stimuli that were at, and adjacent to, the category boundary.
2A secondary analysis of arcsine transformed data revealed the same pattern
as the analysis of untransformed data.
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FIGURE 6 | Test categorization response accuracy in equal frequency
(EFED) and unequal frequency conditions (UFED). Stimulus values
correspond to stimuli selected from the entire stimulus range (i.e.,
stimuli 1–15). Error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean
(N = 60).
FIGURE 7 | Test categorization response time in equal frequency
(EFED) and unequal frequency conditions (UFED). Stimulus values
correspond to stimuli selected from the entire stimulus range (i.e., stimuli
1–15). Error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean (N = 60).
Category response frequencies
In the categorical perception literature, category boundaries were
originally assessed by examining category response frequencies
across a stimulus continuum (cf. Pisoni and Tash, 1974). These
analyses allow for the identification of the location and shape of
a category boundary. Whereas continuous increases in stimulus
magnitude relative to some criterion (e.g., brightness, size) can
be fit a continuous function, categorical perception is typically
reflected in a sigmoidal function (Harnad, 1987). Our analyses
determined the frequency of “Cax” responses as a proportion of
total category responses for each level along the stimulus contin-
uum (e.g., frequency of “Miv” responses reflects the inverse of
this function). These results were then plotted across the stimulus
continuum, and a sigmoid function was fitted to the data.
FIGURE 8 | Mean categorization response frequencies for equal
frequency (EFED) and unequal frequency conditions (UFED). Stimulus
values correspond to stimuli selected from the entire stimulus range (i.e.,
stimuli 1–15). Vertical dashed lines represent the estimated category
boundaries.
Figure 8 suggests that the category response frequencies in
EFED and UFED conditions were consistent with a sigmoidal
shape, and indicate that a category boundary was present at
or near stimulus 8, the mid-point of the stimulus continuum.
The sigmoid function provided an adequate fit in the EFED
[F(2, 12) = 7943.437,MSE < 0.001, p < 0.001,R2adj > 0.999] and
UFED [F(2, 12) = 8110.364, MSE < 0.001, p < 0.001, R2adj >
0.999] conditions. Parameter estimates confirm that the point
of inflection in each case was approximately located at stimulus
8 (x0,EFED = 8.020, x0,UFED = 8.165). Thus, stimulus identifica-
tion in the test phase is consistent with categorical perception.
Affective ratings of eeriness
In order to examine the location and property of the global min-
ima in eeriness ratings that correspond to the uncanny valley, we
conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA that included stimulus
location (15) as a within-subjects variable and stimulus train-
ing distribution (2) as a between-subjects variable. Relative to the
previous analyses of categorization accuracy and response time,
this approach allows for a straightforward comparison between
the shapes of the function that fit affective responses provided
below. Our analysis revealed a marginally significant effect of
stimulus location, F(14, 812) = 3.267, MSE = 15.128, p = 0.055,
η2p = 0.053. The interaction between stimulus location and train-
ing distribution did not approach significance, F(14, 812) = 1.706,
MSE = 15.128, p = 0.193, η2p = 0.029.
Although an interaction was not observed between stimulus
location and stimulus training distribution, Figure 9 suggests that
the trend of affective responses did change as a function of stimu-
lus training distribution. In the EFED condition, an overall linear
trend was observed across the continuum, with an affective min-
imum at one end of the stimulus continuum, and an affective
maximum at the other end. Such a pattern would be expected if
participants were using one response category as reference point
and comparing stimulus exemplars to that category. By contrast,
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FIGURE 9 | Test affective responses (lower is more eerie) in equal
frequency (EFED) and unequal frequency conditions (UFED). Stimulus
values correspond to stimuli selected from the entire stimulus range (i.e.,
stimuli 1–15). Error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean (N = 60).
in the UFED condition an M-shape was instead observed, with
affective minima at the category boundary as well as at the end-
points of the stimulus continuum. When comparing these results
to those obtained in the analyses of categorization responses, it
is instructive to note that the stimuli associated with the slow-
est response times and lowest levels of categorization accuracy
were not those that generated the highest levels of eeriness. As
such, it is reasonable to conclude that there is a degree of dissocia-
tion between categorization performance and affective responses.
Thus, while categorical perception appears to be compatible with
the uncanny valley hypothesis, it also appears that the affec-
tive component of the valley is influenced by other affective and
cognitive processes.
Correlations
The variation in patterns across our dependent measures
prompted an examination of the relationship between these mea-
sures. Test accuracy, test response time, and affective ratings were
included in a correlational analysis. We examined the EFED and
UFED conditions separately.
As Table 2 indicates, in both the EFED and UFED con-
ditions, marginally significant negative correlations were
obtained between response time and categorization accuracy,
r(14) = −0.485, p = 0.079, and r(14) = −0.517, p = 0.059,
respectively. However, in both conditions, the correlation
between categorization response time and eeriness did not
reach significance, ps > 0.5. Thus, while an increase in response
time was observed near the category boundary, the remaining
differences in responses did not support an interpretation that
response time and eeriness ratings were produced by the same
response processes. Equally important, in both conditions,
the correlation between accuracy and eeriness did not reach
significance, ps > 0.5. Thus, while it appears that information
processing associated with the production of a categorization
response and affect were related, category membership and
Table 2 | Pearson correlations of dependent measure in the test phase
for equal frequency (EFED) and unequal frequency conditions (UFED).
Response Time Accuracy
EFED
Accuracy −0.485 (0.079) -
Eeriness 0.076 (0.796) −0.059 (0.842)
UFED
Accuracy −0.517 (0.059) -
Eeriness 0.136 (0.643) 0.076 (0.797)
p-values are in brackets.
affective responses differed in important ways. These differences
appear to be a result of novel extrapolation items, something that
is inconsistent with a category boundary model of the UCV.
Curve fitting analysis
Mori’s original proposal assumed that the uncanny valley is char-
acterized by a non-linear response function. In the present exper-
iment, we sought to directly test this assumption by fitting curves
to the obtained response functions (see also Burleigh et al., 2013)
for both EFED and UFED training conditions. A second goal of
the present analysis was to obtain evidence for the underlying rep-
resentation that supports the uncanny valley either in terms of a
category boundary or an exemplar-based representation.
A number of non-linear functions were selected on theo-
retical grounds that were not included in Mori’s original char-
acterization of the model. In particular, our manipulation of
frequency effects in the context of a categorization experiment
was motivated by the belief that when participants are sensitized
to specific regions of the response continuum, the location of
affective minima and maxima can be manipulated. As we noted,
a category boundary representation would be evidenced by a
U-shaped quadratic function, whereas an exemplar-based cate-
gory representation would be evidenced by an M-shaped quintic
function.
We used a curve fitting analytic approach to test these possibil-
ities, by fitting polynomials of degree 0 through 5 (i.e., constant,
linear, quadratic, cubic, quartic, and quintic) to the means. Curve
fitting was performed using Origin Lab (originlab.com) software.
We used the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; see Burnham
and Anderson, 2002) as our goodness-of-fit index. The AIC is
suited to comparing models with different degrees of complex-
ity because it penalizes models with additional fit parameters.
We calculated raw Akaike values and Akaike Weights (wi), which
are a transformation of raw scores that indicate the probabil-
ity that a particular model among the set of models is correct
(Wagenmakers and Farrell, 2004). Using these weights, we also
calculated evidence ratios by dividing the weight of one model
by the sum of all weights. These ratios are understood in context
of a “confidence set,” which is similar to a confidence inter-
val and is defined as 10% of the highest Akaike Weight in the
set (Royall, 1997). Thus, models falling outside of the confi-
dence set can be rejected as poorer fits to the data. For the
purposes of interpretation, it should be noted that lower raw
Akaike values and higher Akaike Weights indicate a better fit
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to the data. The results of these analyses are summarized in
Table 3.
In the EFED condition, the constant, linear, and quadratic
models fell outside the confidence set. Thus, accounts based on
random responding or based on the association of equivalent
negative affect for each stimuli are not supported (constant).
Participants also did not appear to be solely biased by one end of
the response continuum (linear). Perhaps most importantly for
our purposes, a failure to obtain a fit for the quadratic function
suggests that a category boundary model does not provide a good
fit to the data in the absence of other assumptions. Instead, the
model within the confidence set that was most likely to represent
the data was the quartic model, wi(AIC) = 0.542. Thus, there is
a 54.2% chance that the quartic model best accounts for the pat-
tern or data we observed. However, the cubic model obtained an
Akaike weight of a similar magnitude, wi(AIC) = 0.396. Given
the similarity of these model weights, it would be reasonable to
select the cubic function over the quartic function on the basis
of its parsimony. This finding suggests that, for at least one cat-
egory, the stimulus frequency manipulation produced a change
in response affect and that a category boundary model cannot
adequately account for the data.
In the UFED condition, we again observed that the constant
and linear models fell outside the confidence set. In the same
manner as the EFED condition, this suggests that a constant
response bias or uniform negative affect were not evidenced in
participants’ responses (constant) and that a single category was
Table 3 | Residual sums of squares (RSS) and Akaike values for equal
frequency, equal distribution (EFED), unequal frequency conditions,




Model RSS AICc i(AIC) wi(AIC) CI
EFED Constant1 3.521 −19.43 52.81 < 0.001 0.054
Condition Linear2 0.431 −48.26 23.98 < 0.001 –
Quadratic3 0.152 −60.70 11.54 0.002 –
Cubic4 0.057 −71.61 0.63 0.396 –
Quartic5 0.040 −72.24 0.00 0.542 –
Quintic6 0.036 −67.84 4.40 0.060 –
UFED Constant1 0.386 −52.59 4.76 0.064 0.069
Condition Linear2 0.328 −52.36 4.99 0.057 –
Quadratic3 0.246 −53.45 3.90 0.099 –
Cubic4 0.235 −50.36 6.99 0.021 –
Quartic5 0.135 −54.01 3.34 0.131 –
Quintic6 0.073 −57.35 0.00 0.693 –
UFUD Constant1 1.145 −36.28 23.26 < 0.001 0.069
Condition Linear2 0.534 −45.03 14.51 < 0.001 –
Quadratic3 0.188 −57.52 2.02 0.252 –
Cubic4 0.181 −54.22 5.32 0.049 –
Quartic5 0.093 −59.54 0.00 0.693 –
Quintic6 0.091 −53.99 5.54 0.043 –
Superscript denotes K, the number of parameters in the model.
not used as the sole basis for comparison (linear). Instead, the
model within the confidence set that is most likely to represent
the data was the quintic model. wi(AIC) = 0.693, and the next
best model was the quartic model, wi(AIC) = 0.131. Thus, the
obtained difference between these models clearly suggests that a
quintic function best represents this data set. Taken along with
the EFED results, the observation that a quintic function provides
the best fit again suggests that the inclusion of exemplar-based
representation is an important feature of a model of the UCV
phenomenon.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 1 add further evidence to the literature
for the existence of the UCV phenomenon. Our results, however,
qualify categorical perception accounts. Our measures of catego-
rization accuracy, response frequencies, and response latencies all
produced categorical response functions indicating that partici-
pants successfully learned the category structures. These analyses
also suggest that the equivalent categorization performance was
obtained on either side of the category boundary, which indi-
cates that categories (i.e., Cax and Miv) were learned equally well.
Similarly, whether participants were trained with exemplars with
equal frequencies or unequal frequencies did not appear to alter
the location of the category boundary. In both equal frequency
(EFED) and unequal conditions (UFED), the category boundary
was located at stimulus 8. Greater accuracy was obtained for items
adjacent to the category boundary in the equal frequency condi-
tion relative to those in the unequal frequency condition. While
such findings indicate categorical perception, it is not necessarily
the case that categorical processing is the primary determinant of
affective responses.
In order for the UCV to be understood in a manner simi-
lar to Mori’s initial conceptualization, an affective relationship
must be established with the location of exemplars along a con-
tinuum. Our curve-fitting analysis of eeriness ratings indicated
that there were differences between the frequency training con-
ditions. In the equal frequency condition, the response pattern
was best fit by a cubic function. This pattern was evidenced
by a slope, indicating that one response category was preferred
to the other, and also a non-linear component at one end of
the stimulus continuum. This pattern did not conform to our
a priori hypotheses. Therefore, we can only speculate about its
causes. One possibility is that the response pattern was an arti-
fact of the category-response-key mappings that were used in
our design. Each response category was assigned to a specific key
on the keyboard, and participants were instructed to use index
fingers on different hands for each key. As the location of the
“C” and “M” keys are fixed on a standard QWERTY keyboard,
handedness could have played a role. A second possibility is that
the response labels themselves could have introduced some bias.
For instance, participants might have preferred “Cax” because it
occurs earlier in the alphabet, or because it was more familiar
to them (due to associations with phonetically similar words),
or they might have adopted a related response heuristic where
in one category was used to anchor judgments (e.g., due to
reading labels from left to right), or one of the category labels
might have been more meaningful than another which resulted
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in differential leaning outcomes (as has been observed with non-
sense syllables, see Davis, 1930). If these factors systematically
affected performance, they do not appear to be evidenced in the
unequal frequency condition. The asymmetries obtained in the
EFED condition are likely a result of idiosyncratic response biases
and strategies used by the participants in this condition. In the
unequal frequency condition, the response pattern was best fit
by a quintic function. This pattern was M-shaped, with a valley-
region located near the category boundary, and two affective
minima located near the extrema. Importantly, however, because
the pattern was symmetrically distributed around the category
boundary, it did not possess all of the features of the classic
UCV function and therefore would only support a weak UCV
interpretation.
The differences in response functions for categorization accu-
racy and eeriness ratings also suggest an important relationship
that has been neither specified nor explicitly examined in the liter-
ature examining the UVH. Namely, we found that categorization
accuracy and affect did not significantly co-vary. Such a finding
has important implications for studies of the UVH that claim
that it can be accounted for by categorical perception. We suggest
that the methods of Experiment 1 played a key role in dissoci-
ating affective and categorical responses. By requiring affective
responses immediately after stimulus presentation and prior to
categorical responses, the probability that categorical information
was available was reduced. Two differences in findings provide
clear demonstrations of this dissociation. First, the small amount
of error variance in the categorization responses observed for
the items on the end of the distribution in the test session can
be sharply contrasted against the larger error variance for the
affective responses. Second, whereas categorization accuracy was
uniformly high and response times were uniformly fast for items
located near the ends of the distributions, affective ratings instead
showed asymmetric effects with the response functions.
Another interesting finding was the absence of a relationship
between response time and eeriness. Long response latencies are
typically taken as evidence of response uncertainty. If eeriness is
a consequence of uncertainty in the category membership of an
exemplar, then eeriness and response times should exhibit a pos-
itive correlation. Instead, the absence of a significant correlation
suggests that the processes that determine the uncertainty in cat-
egory membership and the processes underlying eeriness might
be supported by different affective and cognitive processes. Thus,
whereas the uncanny valley appears to be a product of experi-
ence with exemplars, these two processes appear to be separable.
It is necessarily the case that at some level of processing these pro-
cesses must be influenced by the same stimulus information. Yet
stages of processing appear to be evidenced such that affective rat-
ings were influenced more by novel exemplars that represented
extrapolations for the range of training stimuli, whereas catego-
rization responses appear to be primary influenced by categorical
representations of the stimulus continuum stored in long-term
memory.
Experiment 1 therefore provides preliminary evidence in
support of the frequency-based exposure model of the UVH,
and against the categorical perception model. However, cate-
gorization responses were consistent with a category boundary
representation. Therefore, we suggest that frequency-based
memory representations and category boundary representations
are both stored in long-term memory, but that the representation
of this information produces different patterns of performance
in affective and categorical responses. A remaining possibility is
that the UCV phenomenon requires both unequal frequencies
within a category, and unequal distributions for both reference
categories. Experiment 2 examines this possibility.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was conducted to clarify the relationship between
variables observed in Experiment 1 while also further investi-
gating the effect of distributional properties on categorical and
affective responses. One way to interpret Mori’s (1970) proposal
is that there is nothing intrinsically important about the human
category. Rather, it is only our frequency of exposure to, or famil-
iarity with, stimuli that results in a category being used as a point
of reference. As a result, non-human categories contrasted against
the human category are likely to be perceived as less familiar due
to their lower frequency. Thus, Mori’s proposal might take for
granted that two conditions need to be met for the experience
of eeriness to occur when contrasting categories: a small number
of items from one category need to be observed with high fre-
quency and a larger number of items need to be observed from a
contrasting category with unequal frequency.
METHODS
Participants
A total of 30 participants were recruited online for this study
(12 female, Mage = 34.3). As before, participants were recruited
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform and paid a total of $5
if they completed all 4 sessions of the study. All participants were
registered with Mechanical Turk as United States residents. No
participants reported having a visual impairment, and therefore
no participants were excluded from our analyses. All participants
consented to participate in the study.
Stimuli
The same stimuli were used to ensure a direct comparison with
Experiment 1.
Procedure
All procedures were identical to Experiment 1 with the exception
of training frequency. In Experiment 2, we presented partici-
pants with one category from the equal frequency condition in
Experiment 1 and another category from the unequal frequency
condition. We refer to this distribution as the unequal frequency,
unequal distribution (UFED) condition below.
RESULTS
As in Experiment 1, we analyzed categorization accuracy, catego-
rization response times, categorization response frequencies, and
affective responses in the training and test phases. We also con-
ducted curve fitting analyses to facilitate our interpretation of the
affective response pattern. Again we report Greenhouse-Geisser
unadjusted values and unadjusted degrees of freedom.
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FIGURE 10 | Training categorization response accuracy in the unequal
frequency, unequal distribution condition. Stimulus values correspond to
stimuli selected from the training range (i.e., stimuli 3–13). Error bars
represent 1 standard error of the mean (N = 60).
TRAINING PHASE
Response accuracy
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on categorization
accuracy, using stimulus location relative to the category bound-
ary (4) and response category (2) as within-subjects variables.
Unequal and equal frequency categories were assigned to stimuli
located on the left- and right-halves of the stimulus continuum,
respectively. Similarly, we also collapsed across morph models
and excluded the category boundary stimulus, as well as stim-
uli directly adjacent to the category boundary, because training
for these stimuli occurred for only one of the two response cat-
egories. As in Experiment 1, we obtained a significant main
effect for stimulus distance from the category boundary, F(3, 87) =
21.725, MSE < 0.001, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.428. However, unlike
Experiment 1, we also obtained a significant main effect
for category, F(1, 29) = 8.942, MSE < 0.001, p = 0.006, η2p =
0.236, and a significant interaction between category and
stimulus distance, F(3, 87) = 20.951, MSE < 0.001, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.4193.
Figure 10 suggests that this interaction can be accounted for by
an asymmetry in the frequency of exemplars contained within the
response categories. Specifically, with responses to the unequal
frequency category, the stimulus nearest the category boundary
(stimulus 6) was associated with lower categorization accuracy
than stimuli at more distal locations. In contrast, the stimulus
nearest the boundary (stimulus 10) in the equal frequency cat-
egory received accuracy similar to other stimuli in its response
category. These results replicate the unequal and equal frequency
conditions in Experiment 1, respectively.
Response times
A similar repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for catego-
rization response time. Prior to this analysis, we removed outlying
3A secondary analysis of arcsine transformed data revealed the same pattern
as the analysis of untransformed data.
FIGURE 11 | Training categorization response time in the unequal
frequency, unequal distribution condition. Stimulus values correspond to
stimuli selected from the training range (i.e., stimuli 3–13). Error bars
represent 1 standard error of the mean (N = 60).
trials with response times greater than 3 standard deviations
from a participant’s mean response time for each stimulus. This
resulted in a removal of 2% of all trials. As with the analysis of
accuracy, main effects were observed for exemplar distance from
the category boundary, F(3, 87) = 9.048, MSE = 780.019, p <
0.001, and response category, F(1, 29) = 6.481, MSE = 635.357,
p = 0.016, as well as an interaction between stimulus dis-
tance and response category, F(3, 87) = 13.83, MSE = 538.695,
p < 0.001.
Figure 11 suggests that, as in the case of accuracy, this inter-
action can be accounted for by an asymmetry in the response
categories. Specifically, in the unequal frequency condition, the
stimulus nearest the category boundary (stimulus 6) was associ-
ated with slower response times than were stimuli at more distal
locations. In contrast, stimulus 10 in the equal frequency con-
dition was associated with response times equivalent to those of
other stimuli in its response category.
TEST PHASE
Response accuracy
A repeated measures ANOVA was also conducted on categoriza-
tion response accuracy for stimuli presented during the test phase.
As in Experiment 1, this analysis included stimuli adjacent to the
category boundary, because participants received an equal fre-
quency of these stimuli in each response category during test.
Again, the category boundary stimulus was not included, as there
was no objective criteria that could be used to determine accu-
racy. Thus, stimulus location relative to the category boundary
(7) and response category (2) were entered as within-subjects
variables.
Replicating the findings of the training phase, we observed
significant main effects for stimulus distance from the cate-
gory boundary, F(6,174) = 39.887,MSE = 0.027, p < 0.001, η2p =
0.579, response category, F(1, 29) = 4.516, MSE = 0.021, p =
0.042, η2p = 0.135, and a significant interaction between response
category and stimulus distance, F(6, 174) = 4.082, MSE = 0.051,
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FIGURE 12 | Test categorization response accuracy in the unequal
frequency, unequal distribution condition. Stimulus values correspond to
stimuli selected from the training range (i.e., stimuli 3–13). Error bars
represent 1 standard error of the mean (N = 60).
p = 0.036, η2p = 0.1344. An examination of Figure 12 indicates
that in each response category, the boundary-adjacent stimulus
was associated with lower accuracy. However, accuracy was lower
for the boundary-adjacent stimulus in the unequal frequency
category in comparison to the equal frequency category.
Categorization response times
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with categorization
response time as the dependent variable. Unlike the analysis of
training stimuli, no outliers met the removal criterion. Therefore,
all responses were entered into the response time analysis. A main
effect for stimulus distance from the category boundary reached
significance, F(6, 174) = 3.155,MSE = 40747.27, p = 0.044, η2p =
0.098. Figure 13 indicates that response times for stimuli adjacent
to the category boundary were relatively slower than response
times for other stimuli. Again, this reflects uncertainty in category
membership.
Category response frequencies
As in Experiment 1, we determined the frequency of “Cax”
responses as a proportion of total category responses for each
level along the stimulus continuum. These response frequencies
were plotted across the stimulus continuum, and fitted a sigmoid
function to the data.
4A secondary analysis of this data was conducted using arcsine transformed
proportion correct values. This analysis revealed a similar pattern as the analy-
sis of untransformed data. A change from significant to marginally significant
results were observed for the main effect of response category [F(1, 29) =
4.161, MSE = 0.058, p = 0.051, η2p = 0.125] and also for the interaction
between response category and stimulus distance [F(6, 174) = 2.666, MSE =
0.093, p = 0.074, η2p = 0.084]. The differences between these analyses of
transformed and untransformed data can likely be attributed to a reduction
in observed power. Specifically, power for the main effect of response category
was reduced from β = 0.538 to β = 0.505, and power for the interaction was
reduced from β = 0.602 to β = 0.527.
FIGURE 13 | Test categorization response time in the unequal
frequency, unequal distribution condition. Stimulus values correspond to
stimuli selected from the entire stimulus range (i.e., stimuli 1–15). Error
bars represent 1 standard error of the mean (N = 60).
FIGURE 14 | Categorization response frequencies in the unequal
frequency, unequal distribution condition. Stimulus values correspond to
stimuli selected from the entire stimulus range (i.e., stimuli 1–15). The
vertical dashed line represent the estimated category boundary.
Figure 14 suggests that the category response frequencies were
consistent with a sigmoidal function, and indicate that a category
boundary was present near stimulus 8. A sigmoid function was
found to provide an adequate fit to the data, F(2, 12) = 8312.653,
MSE < 0.001, p < 0.001,R2adj > 0.999. Parameter estimates indi-
cate that the point of inflection was located at 7.63. These results
suggest that, in comparison to the EFED and UFED conditions in
Experiment 1, the location of the category boundary was biased
toward the unequal frequency category.
In order to test the possibility that the category boundary in
the UFUD condition was biased due to the unequal frequency
category, we conducted a follow-up analysis. We fit a sigmoid
function to the response frequencies for each participant in all
three of the training conditions. Then, we used two-tailed t-tests
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to compare the mean inflection points for each of the training
conditions. As expected, the location of the category boundary
did not differ between the EFED (M = 7.955, SD = 0.586) and
UFED (M = 8.186, SD = 0.786) conditions, t(58) = 1.283, p =
0.205. However, a significant difference was observed between the
UFUD (M = 7.641, SD = 0.815) and UFED conditions, t(58) =
2.636, p = 0.011; and a marginally significant difference was
observed between the UFUD and EFED conditions, t(58) = 1.713,
p = 0.092.
Affective ratings of eeriness
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on affective rat-
ings, with stimulus location (15) entered as a within-subjects
variable. Themain effect of stimulus location did not reach signif-
icance, F(14, 406) = 1.387,MSE = 15.306, p = 0.258, η2p = 0.046.
However, a visual inspection of Figure 15 suggests a pattern that
is aligned with our expectations. Specifically, there appears to be
a local minimum near the category boundary, and a slope that
indicates a small bias toward the unequal frequency category.
Correlations
Test accuracy, test response time, and affective ratings were
included in a correlational analysis. Replicating the results of
Experiment 1, we again observed a significant correlation between
response time and categorization accuracy, r(14) = −0.78, p <
0.001. Neither the correlation of eeriness ratings and accuracy,
r(14) = −0.14, p = 0.64, nor eeriness ratings and categorization
response time reached significance, r(14) = 0.26, p = 0.36. As in
Experiment 1, these findings can be taken as suggesting that the
response processes associated with affective ratings and catego-
rization differ.
Curve fitting analysis
Next, we were interested in assessing the affective response trend.
A visual inspection of Figure 15 suggests that the UFUD con-
dition produced a distorted M-shape with a shallower region
FIGURE 15 | Test affective responses (lower is more eerie) in the
unequal frequency, unequal distribution condition. Stimulus values
correspond to stimuli selected from the entire stimulus range (i.e., stimuli
1–15). Error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean (N = 60).
of negative affect near the category boundary, and a positive
bias toward the unequal frequency category. As in Experiment 1,
we fit polynomials of degree 0 through 5 (i.e., constant, linear,
quadratic, cubic, quartic, and quintic) to the data, and we used
the AIC as our goodness-of-fit index when comparing models.
As Table 3 suggests, constant, linear, cubic, and quintic mod-
els were rejected as they fell outside the confidence set. The model
within the confidence set that wasmost likely to represent the data
was the quartic model. This can be seen in the size of its Akaike
weight, wi(AIC) = 0.693, meaning that it there is a 69.3% chance
that it is the best model within the set. Although the quadratic
model was also in the confidence set, its Akaike weight was
relatively much smaller, wi(AIC) = 0.252. Thus, it would be rea-
sonable to select the quartic function as best representing the data.
Given the correspondence between this response pattern and the
frequency-based training condition, we suggest that this result
provides further evidence in support of our frequency-based
exposure model of the uncanny valley phenomenon.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 2 further qualify those obtained in
Experiment 1. Although categorical performance patterns were
similar to those of Experiment 1, we observed an asymmetry
in categorization accuracy. Specifically, accuracy was lower for
boundary-adjacent stimuli in the unequal frequency response
category that was defined by fewer exemplars near the bound-
ary, relative to the response category with more exemplars near
the boundary. This suggests that the frequency training had the
intended effect on categorical performance. A similar asymme-
try was also observed in affective responses. However, given that
measures of response times and accuracy did not correlate with
affective responses, it is clear that the asymmetry in categorical
perception was not the only, or even the primary, determinant
of the affective asymmetry. In line with the proposed frequency-
based exposure model of the UVH, we suggest that these patterns
have a common cause, but that they are due to separable pro-
cesses. Namely, they are both rooted in the memory traces that
are encoded into long-term memory, as a result of participants’
exposure to stimuli. Importantly, whereas categorical perception
is the result of categorical processes which draw upon these long-
term memory stores in order to determine category membership,
affective responses appear to be driven by separate sub-categorical
processes used to assess familiarity.
Another finding of particular importance to assessing the
claims of the UVH is that the affective response pattern was in
closer correspondence to the function described by Mori (1970).
Specifically, we observed a slope which indicated a preference for
one of the categories, and a valley region of eeriness at an inter-
mediate region in perceptual space which was biased toward the
preferred category. The primary difference between this pattern
and the function described by Mori (1970) consists of the depth
of the valley, and also the local affective minimum at the extreme
of the preferred category. Given the similarities, we believe this
pattern would provide support for a strong interpretation of
UCV. These findings suggest that when a dominant reference cat-
egory defined by a smaller number of high frequency exemplars is
located along the same continuum as a non-dominant contrasting
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category defined by a larger number of low frequency exemplars,
that the reference category is associated with less negative affect.
Not only does such a pattern conform to the mere exposure effect
(Zajonc, 1968), but it also appears to be a reasonable general-
ization of the UVH proposed by Mori (1970). Thus, the critical
finding of Experiment 2 is that although the pattern of responses
observed in categorization performance and affective responses
do not co-vary, within-category differences in exemplar frequency
changed participants’ affective responses. Frequency effects are
thereby at least as important a determinant of the UCV as cate-
gorical perception. We consider the boarder implications of these
findings below.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the present study, we obtained patterns across multiple depen-
dent measures that are consistent with the UVH. Our use of
affective and categorization responses further allows us to draw
specific conclusions concerning the relationship between these
processes, thereby establishing the phenomena of the uncanny
valley as well as determining its specific properties. Our anal-
yses of cognitive responses strongly suggests that participants
perceived the stimuli categorically (Cheetham et al., 2011), as evi-
denced in participants’ categorization responses. Our analyses of
affective responses revealed patterns that were consistent with the
UCV function proposed by Mori (1970), providing a weak cor-
respondence in Experiment 1, and a strong correspondence in
Experiment 2. Importantly, the lack of an association between
categorical and affective responses strongly suggests that affective
responses cannot be understood in terms of categorical percep-
tion. Rather, categorization responses conform to patterns that
would be predicted by a category boundary in terms of categorical
perception, whereas affective responses conform to patterns that
would be predicted on the basis of prototype or exemplar-based
models. Exemplar-based models further allow for the possibility
that sub-categorical properties of the stimuli influence affective
responses. Thus, in addition to providing support to the uncanny
valley hypothesis, our results provide an important distinction
that has not, to the best of our knowledge, been adequately made
within the UCV literature. We discuss this in detail below.
UNCANNY CATEGORIES
Our observation that the uncanny valley is not solely the result of
categorical perception stands in sharp contrast to recent accounts
of the phenomenon (e.g., Burleigh et al., 2013; Yamada et al.,
2013). In the categorization literature, there is still a lack of con-
sensus about how category members are processed and stored.
A pertinent distinction for the present discussion is whether an
exemplar-based representation or a category boundary is used to
classify stimuli. In contrast to early accounts that merely assumed
that humans used definitions including necessary and sufficient
conditions to classify stimuli, later accounts of categorization pro-
vided evidence that summary representations could play a critical
role (Posner and Keele, 1968; Rosch and Mervis, 1975). A defi-
ciency of these models, however, is that they fail to account for
the retention of distributional properties of the stimuli (e.g.,
the distribution of all feline traits in domesticated cats) as well
as particular instance (e.g., your pet cat). In the context of the
present study, we cannot distinguish between category bound-
ary and exemplar-based models of categorization performance.
Difficulties in distinguishing between these models of categoriza-
tion has been observed elsewhere when distributional properties
have been manipulated experimentally (e.g., Stewart and Chater,
2002) as well as when these models are equated computationally
(Ashby and Maddox, 1993). More specifically, difficulties in dis-
tinguishing these accounts on the basis of behavioral responses
are likely a result of the general adaptability of participants to
exemplar frequency in terms of category set size (e.g., Smith and
Minda, 1998) and multiple learning systems (e.g., Nosofsky et al.,
1994; Ashby et al., 1998). Our manipulation does, however, allow
us to distinguish between alternative accounts of the UCV.
In the present study, we found strong evidence that supports
the role of exemplar frequenies in determining affective responses.
Unlike categorization responses wherein the category boundary
was the primary determinant of performance, extrapolation items
outside the initial training range were associated with greater
negative affect relative to items within the training range. Such
a finding is of considerable interest given that it goes against
a number of well-established findings in the psychological lit-
erature. Specifically, end effects are observed when stimuli are
presented along a stimulus continuum, and extreme items are
identified more quickly and accurately then intermediate items
(for a recent exemplar-based model, see Kent and Lamberts,
2005). Thus, when translated into the present study, we might
imagine that negative affective responses should reach a minima
in these regions. Similarly, these exemplars shared the smallest
number of features with the contrasting category, meaning that
there should be little feature mismatch. Our results indicate that a
categorical perception model is inadequate in accounting for the
results we obtained that support the UCV.
AFFECT AND INFORMATION PROCESSING
In contrast to categorical perception accounts of the UVH, the
affective responses of our participants clearly demonstrate sensi-
tivities to the distributional properties of categories that resulted
from the manipulation of exemplar frequencies (see also, Förster
et al., 2010; Gillebaart et al., 2012). Distinguishing between affec-
tive and cognitive processes should be of central importance to
those interested in examining the UVH. Our results are unam-
biguous in differentiating between categorization performance
and affective response with a sharp category boundary defining
the former and graded, U-shaped (parabolic) functions defining
the latter within each response category. These results might be
unique to the present experimental design. A limitation of the
present study is that we purposefully chose not to counterbal-
ance the order of eeriness ratings and categorization responses.
Our selection of this design followed from research that affec-
tive responses are typically produced faster than more effort-
ful cognitive processing (Bless et al., 1990; Haidt, 2001) while
decision-making appears to require that alternatives have affec-
tive valence (e.g., Damasio, 1994). A straightforward account
of the present findings could be that the gradation in affective
responses relative to the categorization responses was a conse-
quence of the additional processing time resulting in activation of
the category structure in long-term memory. We do not consider
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this an important concern as we wished to demonstrate that
frequency-based information influenced responses and acted as a
determinant of the uncanny valley. Moreover, in a meta-analysis
of the mere exposure effect conducted by Bornstein (1989), delays
in preference ratings were shown to increase effect size. Thus, the
results of the present study might reflect smaller effect sizes than
are possible.
Interesting parallels have been drawn between the UVH and
the speech perception literature (Moore, 2012). Namely, an exam-
ination of identification functions generally reveals strong evi-
dence for categorical perception whereas identification response
time can demonstrate slight gradations in response around the
category boundary (Pisoni and Tash, 1974). Pisoni and Tash
(1974) suggested that stimuli first undergo acoustic processing
followed by phonemic processing. Depending on the speed of
responses and the rate at which stimuli are presented, listeners can
detect acoustic differences although there is a strong bias for iden-
tification on the basis of native linguistic distinctions. Additional
evidence is provided by studies that have used ratings of stimu-
lus typicality relative to a particular response category wherein
listeners produce highly graded responses (Miller and Volaitis,
1989). For instance, Schoenherr and Logan (Schoenherr et al.,
2012; Schoenherr and Logan, 2013, 2014) have examined individ-
uals’ performance when learning non-native phonemes wherein
they were provided with feedback to reorganize a native con-
tinuum. These adult listeners appeared to be subjectively aware
of the native category structure while producing identification
responses that were influenced by the acoustic properties. Thus, if
we were to have switched the order of affective and categorization
responses then we might have observed more graded responses
in the categorization response function and less graded responses
in the affective response function. It is critical to note that this
approach does not assess whether the sub-categorical information
that is used to inform such categorization responses is affective in
nature. We take the UVH to necessitate the inclusion of affective
responses.
Our study is not the first to consider the role of categorical per-
ception in the UCV phenomenon (Cheetham et al., 2011, 2014;
Yamada et al., 2013). Cheetham et al. (2011) has proposed that
Mori’s hypothesis be considered “in terms of the well-established
psychological empirical-theoretical framework of category per-
ception and learning,” and further stressed the importance of
“careful definition of the category boundary” (pp. 11–12). They
argued that doing so would be necessary to evaluate the poten-
tial role of categorization ambiguity in eliciting negative affect.
The present study is consistent with these recommendations,
and to the best of our knowledge it is the first to empiri-
cally investigate the UCV phenomenon using a category-learning
paradigm.
In our study, we trained participants on stimuli belonging to
non-human ontological categories to which they had little or no
prior exposure. We designed our training regimen to approxi-
mate the differing levels of experience that participants would
have with natural categories (e.g., human or non-human animal
groups). In addition to finding evidence for categorical percep-
tion, including fitting the data with logistic functions, our analysis
of affective responses demonstrated frequency effects that are
not consistent with categorical perception. In a similar way to
exemplar-based models that have been provided in speech per-
ception literature to account for prototype effects (Lacerda, 1995)
as well as the categorization literature more generally (Medin and
Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1984), we suggest that the frequency of
instances is a critical determinant of the UCV. This is consistent
with accounts in the categorization literature that the frequency of
training stimuli will determine the representation that is acquired
by participants (e.g., Smith and Minda, 1998). Rather than seeing
these results as contradictory, we suggest that sharper concep-
tual and methodological distinctions need to be made in terms
of the contributions of affective and cognitive components. If the
UCV is considered to be a product of a cognitive processes, then
examinations of categorization responses are not sufficient.
The present study, as well as the current literature on the
UVH, leaves open a crucial question asked by researchers study-
ing cognition and affect: what is the causal relationship between
affect and cognition? Presently, we proposed two models of the
uncanny valley phenomenon. Whereas the categorical percep-
tion model assumes that categorical and affective responses are
integrated at some level (Stage 3), the frequency-based exposure
model assumes that they are separable (Stage 2 and Stage 3 pro-
duce different responses). Both models share in the assumption
that responses are a function of stimulus comparisons with rep-
resentations in long-term memory. This elementary distinction
leaves open still further possibilities. Elsewhere in the affective
processing literature, a number of hypotheses have been put
forward which merit investigation (for a review, see Cacioppo
and Gardner, 1999). Perhaps more notably, models of affect in
information processing have suggested that the relationship is
bi-directional, such that affect also has an influence on cogni-
tion (e.g., Bless et al., 1990; Slovic et al., 2002). In general, these
models assume that affect influences the spontaneous adoption
of an automatic or controlled processing strategy by signaling a
benign or problematic situation (Schwarz, 2002, 2010; Schwarz
and Clore, 2007). In these accounts, low-cost heuristics are relied
upon when encounters are expected to go smoothly, but effortful
processing is recruited when obstacles are expected. In context of
the UCV phenomenon, this might suggest that uncanny stimuli
increase the depth of cognitive processing. This claim is sup-
ported by studies that have an association between the amount
of processing and negative affect (Bless et al., 1990). If this is
the case, then we would expect to find differences in memory
recall for items across an uncanny perceptual continuum, such
that uncanny stimuli are more distinctive in memory (Hunt and
Worthen, 2006). If studies of the UVH are to make meaning-
ful, generalizable contributions to the literature of psychology,
they must clarify how the perception of categories and affect are
related. The present study represents a small step in that direction.
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